Consumer Law & Policy Blog

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Wednesday, March 18, 2009

Skiba and Tobacman on Whether Payday Loans Cause Bankruptcy

Paige Marta Skiba of Vanderbilt and Jeremy Tobacman of Penn have co-authored Do Payday Loans Cause Bankruptcy?.  Here's the abstract:

An estimated ten million American households borrow on payday loans each year. Despite the prevalence of these loans, little is known about the effects of access to this form of short-term, high-cost credit. We match individual-level administrative records on payday borrowing to public records on personal bankruptcy, and we exploit a regression discontinuity to estimate the causal impact of access to payday loans on bankruptcy filings. Though the size of the typical payday loan is only $300, we find that loan approval for first-time applicants increases the two-year Chapter 13 bankruptcy filing rate by 2.48 percentage points. There appear to be two components driving this large effect. First, consumers are already financially stressed when they begin borrowing on payday loans. Second, approved applicants borrow repeatedly on payday loans and pawn loans, which carry very high interest rates. For the subsample that identifies our estimates, the cumulative interest burden from payday and pawn loans amounts to roughly 11% of the total liquid debt interest burden at the time of bankruptcy filing.

Posted by Jeff Sovern on Wednesday, March 18, 2009 at 08:23 PM in Consumer Law Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, March 17, 2009

Business pursuing anti-consumer legislation in this economy?

It just goes to show you: there is no time like the present. Even if the present is an economic mess caused by the lack of effective regulation and the plan is to introduce anti-consumer legislation to hamstring consumer (and, for good measure, civil rights) laws.

Democratic legislators in Minnesota recently introduced two bills: one that would eviscerate attorney fee provisions, and the other that would protect businesses' who want to insert mandatory binding arbitration provisions in consumer contracts.

The first bill would require courts to “take into consideration the reasonableness of the attorney fees sought in relation to the amount of damages awarded to the prevailing party.” Since most consumer protection laws contain small statutory damages awards, this would give defendants an incentive to dig in their heels on meritorious claims. And, of course, deter consumer rights lawyers from asserting consumers' rights in court.

The second bill would ensure that businesses will be able to force consumers into binding arbitration whether they like it or not. This is my favorite line in the bill: "The court may not refuse to order arbitration because the claim subject to arbitration lacks merit or grounds for the claim have not [been] established." (The word "been" is missing from the bill text.) In other words, even if the claims are completely frivolous, companies could drag consumers into arbitration.

Not exactly the kind of legislation that will help consumers avoid the traps that led to the debt crisis. It would not surprise me to see businesses and special interests trying to catch consumers unaware in other states, as well.

Attorney fee provisions about to be eviscerated | Caveat Emptor

(photo: roger g1)

Posted by Account Deleted on Tuesday, March 17, 2009 at 09:00 AM in Consumer Legislative Policy | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, March 16, 2009

New Jersey Appellate Court Issues First Musings On Wyeth v. Levine

by Brian Wolfman

In a mammoth opinion on a number of topics, the New Jersey Appellate Division, beginning at page 109, provides its take on what is required to preempt under the Supreme Court's recent drug preemption ruling in  Wyeth v. Levine. As you will see, it's a tough standard, one that defendants are going to have a tough time meeting.

Posted by Brian Wolfman on Monday, March 16, 2009 at 07:04 PM in Preemption | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

CNN Report on Debit Card Fees for Those Receiving Unemployment Benefits

by Jeff Sovern

The unemployed who receive benefits in the form of debit cards often pay fees for the privilege, according to a CNN report.  An excerpt:

The National Consumer Law Center says fees range from 40 cents to a high of $3 per transaction, if the debit card is used at an out-of-network ATM. Most banks give jobless debit card users one free withdrawal per deposit period, which averages every other week in most states. But consumer advocates, including the Law Center, say the unemployed "should be able to obtain cash and perform basic functions with no fees."

Hat tip to Kristie Kline.  But here's my question: if the debit card service costs the banks money (and I have no idea if it does), who should pay for that?

Posted by Jeff Sovern on Monday, March 16, 2009 at 12:18 PM | Permalink | Comments (5) | TrackBack (0)

Sunday, March 15, 2009

Mindless Evictions

By Alan White08foreclose8
As many speakers at last week's annual meeting of the National Community Reinvestment Coalition pointed out, banks are aggravating the blighting impact of foreclosures by mindlessly evicting tenants and former owners, even in markets where homes are not selling.  In normal times, a lender that forecloses a home evicts the occupants, because single family homes are much easier to sell vacant than occupied.  But these are not normal times.  The excellent story by Alex Kotlowitz in the March 8 New York Times magazine takes the reader on a tour of the disastrous impact evictions are having on Cleveland and its neighborhoods.

HUD once had a program that permitted former tenants and occupants to remain in FHA's foreclosed homes, known as the "occupied conveyance" program.  The logic was to allow a foreclosed home to remain occupied if sales were slow and vandalism or other vacancy costs were high.  The banks now accumulating hundreds of thousands of foreclosed homes ("REO") have given little or no thought to the possibility that automatic eviction is dragging down their REO values along with the surrounding communities.

ACORN is organizing a campaign to fight back, and to encourage tenants and owners or former owners to stay in their homes, at least until a bona fide buyer is found by the foreclosing lender.  A Miller-McCune mag. story reports on one homeowner who was offered a useless loan modification by Chase (increasing his payment) who is now refusing to leave.  NCRC has called for a national day of action on June 11 to demand action to save homes, jobs and communities.  This may be the germ of a grassroots movement that will pressure the Administration to stop nudging the mortgage servicing industry and to act boldly and decisively to end the laying waste to homes and neighborhoods (as candidate Obama promised he would do, with a 90-day foreclosure moratorium, on October 13, 2008 in Toledo).  Courts may also begin to rethink the automatic granting of eviction writs for foreclosed homes, especially in areas of concentrated foreclosures and abandonment.
HT to Robert Strupp of the Baltimore Community Law Center (and NYT for its photo).

Posted by Alan White on Sunday, March 15, 2009 at 06:47 PM in Foreclosure Crisis | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Saturday, March 14, 2009

Colbert On Preemption, Brought To You By Prescott Pharmaceuticals

Check out this funny (IMO) Colbert sketch on Wyeth v. Levine and other health-related news, brought to you by Prescott Pharmaceuticals. As Colbert explains, because FDA approval does not guarantee safety, Prescott guarantees the public that its drugs are not FDA approved.

Posted by Brian Wolfman on Saturday, March 14, 2009 at 09:57 AM in Preemption | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, March 13, 2009

Phony Consumer Protection Watch: Is § 1681s-2(a) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act an Example of Phony Consumer Protection?

by Jeff Sovern

We blogged here about phony consumer protection statutes, statutes that are designed to create the illusion of consumer protection, perhaps so legislators can claim to consumer-constituents that they are attending to a problem, but without the reality, maybe so legislators can satisfy business interests and obtain political contributions.  At least one section of the Fair Credit Reporting Act seems like a plausible example of such phony consumer protection for several reasons:  § 1681s-2(a), dealing with the obligation of furnishers of information to credit bureaus (typically, lenders) to furnish accurate information. 

First, it's a difficult statute to decipher.  If consumers can easily understand a statute. it's a poor candidate for phony consumer protection, because it won't deceive anyone.  But complex statutes can more readily conceal defects.  Just how hard is the FCRA in general, and § 1681s-2(a) in particular?  On Wednesday we covered § 1681s-2(a) in class,  Our casebook walks students through it in text.  It also poses a problem on the provision, both to highlight the section and in the hope that students will come into class having worked it out for themselves.  Nevertheless, my students. many of whom appear to be quite smart and who have been able to understand other consumer protection statutes without much difficulty, really struggled with this one.  We had to go over it several times.  If second and third year law students find it hard to understand with the statute in front of them, the issue flagged for them by a problem, an explanation in a text, and my oral explanations, how likely is it that consumers will figure it out?  (I prefer not to think that I was the cause of my students' confusion).

Second, many FCRA provisions, including § 1681s-2(a), cannot be enforced by private claims. In fact, just in case someone didn't figure that out the first time Congress said it, they said twice that there's no private claim to enforce § 1681s-2(a), in both § 1681s-2(c) and (d).  So if a lender violates § 1681s-2(a), the lender need fear only enforcement by governmental agencies.  Given funding for governmental consumer protection agencies, that doesn't seem likely to happen as often as violations of the provision.

The third reason has to do with the content of § 1681s-2(a).  Subsection (a)(1)(a) provides "A person shall not furnish any information relating to a consumer to any consumer reporting agency [i.e., a credit bureau] if the person knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the information is inaccurate."  That seems clear enough.  Subsection (a)(1)(D) even offers a definition: "The term 'reasonable cause to believe that the information is inaccurate' means having specific knowledge, other than solely allegations by the consumer, that would cause a reasonable person to have substantial doubts about the accuracy of the information."  So if an identity thief fills out an application for credit and puts down the wrong address, say, the creditor should not report that as the consumer's transaction unless the creditor does some checking.  I happen to think the standard for accuracy imposed on creditors should be higher than that, but if you disagree with me, well, at least we have a standard that imposes some obligations on creditors. 

But now we get to the part that threw my students. Subsection (a)(1)(C) says the standard I just described doesn't apply to furnishers of information who clearly and conspicuously specify to consumers an address for inaccurate information.  Then the standard becomes that once the creditor is told of an inaccuracy, it can't supply inaccurate information.  In other words,as long as lenders give consumers an address to report inaccurate information, they don't violate the statute even if they give a credit bureau information that a reasonable person would have substantial doubts about, unless someone has told them outright that the information is inaccurate.  And of course, even if they violate this provision by supplying inaccurate information once they've been notified of the inaccuracy, there's still no private claim.

Now there may be creditors that don't supply consumers with an address for inaccuracies.  I don't know of any, but I certainly haven't canvassed the lenders of America.  Somehow, though, I suspect all credit card statements, for example, include customer service contact information for problems. 

So notice what happened with this provision.  It gives legislators who voted for it the ability to tell their constituents that they got through a statute that bars lenders from reporting information that a reasonable person would have substantial doubts about, but it gives lenders an out against having that provision applied against them.  And if something goes wrong, there's no private claim anyway. 

Is this an example of phony consumer protection?  I don't honestly know, because I don't know what Congress's goals were in enacting it, or what was in their minds.  But I sure wonder.  If Congress just wanted lenders to supply an address for problems, all they had to do was require that.  They didn't have to impose an accuracy requirement that lenders could ignore.  So why impose it?  § 1681s-2(e) does provide for regulators to fill in the accuracy standard a bit in regulations, but again, Congress could have enacted that subsection without also enacting a subsection that could easily be gotten around.  Does anybody know a reason for passing 1681s-2(a) other than to give legislators the ability to say they've struck a blow against inaccuracies by creditors?  But here's one thing we do know: as we blogged about here, identity theft is up.  One cost of phony consumer protection is that the problem doesn't get solved.

Posted by Jeff Sovern on Friday, March 13, 2009 at 08:11 PM in Credit Reporting & Discrimination, Identity Theft | Permalink | Comments (3) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, March 12, 2009

Will There Be A Financial Product Safety Commission?

On Tuesday of this week, Senators Chuck Schumer and Dick Durbin introduced Senate Bill 566, which would create a new government agency, the Financial Product Safety Commission, to help consumers obtain financial products and services without being subject to predatory or deceptive financial practices. Sorta like a Consumer Product Safety Commission for financial products. This Harvard Law School webpage highlights the work of Prof. Elizabeth Warren to create an FPSC. It includes a bunch of links, including one to an important article by Prof. Warren and another to her recent appearance on NPR's "Fresh Air" program in which she discussed the FPSC idea. Check out Senator Durbin's press release as well. 

UPDATE: Read this press release in support of the bill from more than 50 civil rights, labor, and consumer  ogranizations, including Public Citizen, Consumer Federation of America, and U.S. PIRG.

Posted by Brian Wolfman on Thursday, March 12, 2009 at 11:31 AM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, March 11, 2009

Fed Proposes New Amendments to Regulation Z

The Fed's proposed regulations deal with student loans and can be found here, along with model forms.  They largely implement the 2008 Higher Education Opportunity Act (HEOA), which amended Truth in Lending, and add a new subpart F to Reg Z.  The regulations also prohibit creditors from co-branding their loan products with educational institutions.  Here's the Board's summary of HEOA's amendments to TILA (not the proposed amendments to Reg Z, but since we hadn't blogged about HEOA at the time, I thought I would include it):

 On August 14, 2008, the Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008 (HEOA) was enacted. Title X of the HEOA, entitled the “Private Student Loan Transparency and Improvement Act of 2008,” adds new subsection 128(e) and section 140 to TILA. These TILA amendments add disclosure requirements and prohibit certain practices for creditors making “private education loans,” defined as loans made expressly for postsecondary educational expenses, but excluding open-end credit, real estate-secured loans, and federal loans under title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965. The HEOA also amends TILA section 104(3) to expressly cover private education loans over $25,000.

1. Overview of the HEOA’s Amendments to TILA

Substantive Restrictions. The HEOA prohibits a creditor from using in its marketing materials a covered educational institution’s name, logo, mascot, or other words or symbols readily identified with the educational institution, to imply that the educational institution endorses the loans offered by the creditor.

With respect to private education loans, the HEOA also amends TILA in the following ways:

• Creditors must give the consumer 30 days after a private education loan application is approved to decide whether to accept the loan offered. During that time, the creditor may not change the rates or terms of the loan offered, except for rate changes based on changes in the index used for rate adjustments on the loan.

• The consumer has a right to cancel the loan for up to three business days after consummation. Creditors are prohibited from disbursing funds until the three day rescission period has run.

Continue reading "Fed Proposes New Amendments to Regulation Z" »

Posted by Jeff Sovern on Wednesday, March 11, 2009 at 01:35 PM in Student Loans | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack (0)

Cuomo v. Clearing House Association: Important Preemption Case in the Supreme Court; Get Your Information Here!

by Brian Wolfman

As Jeff Sovern reported in January, the Supreme Court has taken on an important case concerning the right of states to enforce their consumer protection and civil rights laws against national banks. The case is Cuomo v. Clearing House Association, S. Ct. No. 08-453. The federal regulator of national banks -- the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) -- has, under the National Bank Act, "visitorial" power over national banks. That power preempts the states from engaging in certain substantive regulation within OCC's purview. See, e.g., Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007). But the question in Cuomo is the validity of an OCC regulation that says OCC's visitorial power preempts state enforcement authority, even when the state law or regulation being enforced is not substantively preempted. Just to restate the argument: According to OCC, perfectly valid state laws may not be enforced by duly authorized officials of the very states that enacted them. That's a pretty strong form of preemption, don't you think?

Here is an an amicus brief from a range of consumer advocacy groups, led by the Center for Responsible Lending, and including my group (Public Citizen), as well as AARP, the National Consumer Law Center, U.S. PIRG, and others. Eric Halperin of the Center for Responsible Lending is counsel of record for the these amici.

The brief for the party seeking to upend OCC's pro-preemption policy -- New York AG Andrew Cuomo -- as well as all the other amicus briefs on the no-preemption side can be found here. The Supreme Court's docket for the case is here.

The case will be argued on April 28, and a decision will be issued by the end of June.

Posted by Brian Wolfman on Wednesday, March 11, 2009 at 11:33 AM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

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