by Paul Alan Levy
Last Friday, Danny Sullivan broke the story that the Attorney General of Texas is investigating whether Google violated the antitrust laws by deliberately depressing the search rankings of certain commercial web sites whose services seek to compete with Google. Since then, several bloggers have reacted with outrage or alarm. Despite my respect for several of these voices, I am less than impressed by some of the legal arguments advanced by Eric Goldman on his Technology and Marketing Law Blog, and seconded elsewhere, suggesting that Google might be immune from liability even if, in fact, the evidence adduced in the investigation suggested that Google deliberately reduces the search rankings of some competitors.
For example, Eric Goldman argues that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act would protect Google against antitrust liability. Eric is the leading commentator on Section 230 and I hesitate to say he is wrong, but he devotes his discussion to the filtering provision, section 230(c)(2), which seems inapplicable for several reasons. First, the provision only relates to actions “voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material” that the filterer “considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable.” It is not at all clear to me that Google can argue that these alternate commercial sites meet that standard; nor would Google, I suspect, argue that it is deliberately “restricting access” to the materials. Moreover, this provision protects only “good faith” filtering decisions. Suppose that Google deliberately jiggered its search algorithm to harm competitive web sites; or suppose that it labeled certain web sites so that, after application of the normal algorithm, search ranking for those sites was automatically moved down 20 places (that is, the highest they could appear would be on the third page of rankings). Google would have a hard time arguing that such filtering decisions were taken in good faith. Eric Goldman does not invoke the more familiar aspects of section 230, and for good reason: in the language of the section 230 cases, on such facts Google would itself be responsible for what is illegal about the algorithm or its application. Google would be the information content provider. Thus it could not claim protection under sections 230(c)(1) and (230(e)(3).