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Friday, March 28, 2014

US PIRG and the Center for Digital Democracy issues report calling for regulatory protection from unfair "big data" practices

Here is the groups' press release:

New Report Examines Both the Promise and the Potential Dangers of the New Financial Marketplace

Leading Reform Groups Call for New Regulations to Protect Consumers from Unfair and Discriminatory “Big Data” Practices, Groups File Report with the White House “Big Data” Review Proceeding

 Washington, DC: U.S. PIRG Education Fund and the Center for Digital Democracy (CDD) released a comprehensive new report today focused on the realities of the new financial marketplace and the threats and opportunities its use poses to financial inclusion. The report examines the impact of digital technology, especially the unprecedented analytical and real-time actionable powers of “Big Data,” on consumer welfare. The groups immediately filed the report with the White House Big Data review headed by John Podesta, who serves as senior counselor to the President. The White House is to issue a report in April addressing the impact of “Big Data” practices on the public, including the possible need for additional consumer safeguards.

In addition to the undeniable convenience of online and mobile banking, explains the report, the new financial environment poses a number of challenges, especially for lower-income consumers. Increasingly, the public confronts an invisible “e-scoring” system that may limit their access to credit and other financial services. “We are being placed under a powerful ‘Big Data’ lens, through which, without meaningful transparency or control, decisions about our financial futures are being decided,” the report explains.

Continue reading "US PIRG and the Center for Digital Democracy issues report calling for regulatory protection from unfair "big data" practices" »

Posted by Brian Wolfman on Friday, March 28, 2014 at 03:59 PM | Permalink

Significant win for anti-fracking activist

Public Citizen was in court Monday arguing the case of Vera Scroggins, who has been protesting and documenting the damage caused by fracking the Marcellus Shale in northeastern Pennsylvania. A few months ago, she was hit with an injunction barring her from any property that fracking company Cabot Oil and Gas owns, or to which Cabot leases the mineral rights -- a restriction that covers a huge swath of territory in her home county including her grocery store, the homes of friends, and the hospital nearest her home.

Today, the judge substantially narrowed the injunction. The new order lifts the restrictions on properties that Cabot merely passively leases (without any active operations); it applies only to Cabot-owned property, its active operations, and its access roads. This is a big win for Scroggins, who obtained most of what she was seeking in moving to vacate the injunction and is now in a much better position to carry on her protest and documentary activities (as well as access businesses open to the public and visit her friends). Notably, the judge also rejected Cabot's various alternative proposals that would have imposed 150- or 500-foot buffer zones around parts of their operations.

Continue reading "Significant win for anti-fracking activist" »

Posted by Scott Michelman on Friday, March 28, 2014 at 03:54 PM | Permalink

Thursday, March 27, 2014

Why does the U.S. Chamber oppose small businesses harmed by BP disaster?

That's the title of this thought-provoking piece in The Hill by Public Citizen President Rob Weissman about the amicus brief filed this week by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in the class action over the damage caused by the Deepwater Horizon spill. The Chamber supports BP -- against small U.S. businesses -- in trying to undo a key term of the class action settlement the parties have already reached.

Read the whole piece here.

Posted by Scott Michelman on Thursday, March 27, 2014 at 04:54 PM | Permalink

District court rules in case against Facebook about minors and California Family Code

As we've discussed, briefing is underway before the Ninth Circuit in an appeal regarding the settlement of a class action against Facebook (Fraley v. Facebook) for using its members' images for advertising without their consent -- including the images of minors without their parents' consent.

In a related development, yesterday the same judge in the Northern District of California who approved the challenged settlement in Fraley dismissed a separate lawsuit alleging that Facebook's practices with respect to minors violate provisions of the California Family Code governing what contracts involving minors are valid. The Reuters story is available here. The plaintiffs in the case dismissed yesterday, C.M.D. v. Facebook, had opted out of the Facebook settlement in Fraley, which is why their claims were heard notwithstanding the settlement.

The C.M.D. decision yesterday is likely to be of limited effect on the pending appeal of the class-action settlement in Fraley. Before the Ninth Circuit, the various objectors to the Fraley settlement have advanced two theories pertaining to minors: (1) that the settlement is problematic under the California Family Code and (2) that the settlement is problematic under the California law governing misappropriations of likenesses, along with the similar laws in six other states, all of which prohibit the use of a minor's image for advertising without parental consent. Yesterday's decision addresses only the Family Code argument (the first argument). Although that decision in Facebook's favor may have some persuasive value at the Ninth Circuit, as an appellate court, the Ninth Circuit is free to disagree with what the district court ruled. And yesterday's decision did not address nor have occasion to address the misapprorpriation-law argument (the second argument I've identified), so the decision shouldn't influence how the court of appeals decides that issue.

Posted by Scott Michelman on Thursday, March 27, 2014 at 10:09 AM | Permalink

CDC: More basic prevention efforts needed to prevent hospital infections and resulting illness and death

As reported here, "the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have updated their previous estimates of health care-associated infections through the two reports, one of which is published in the New England Journal of Medicine, NEJM and details 2011 hospital infection estimates from a survey of hospitals in 10 states." Extrapolating from the data reported in the NEJM, the CDC estimates that 1 in 25 U.S. hosptial patients will pick up an infection in the hospital and that, in 2011 alone, about 648,000 U.S. hospital patients contracted about 721,800 hospital-based infections, resulting in around 75,000 deaths. These data represent modest improvements over earlier data, but CDC director Tom Frieden says that many infections can be prevented: "Although there has been some progress, today and every day, more than 200 Americans with health care-associated infections will die during their hospital stay. The most advanced medical care won't work if clinicians don't prevent infections through basic things such as regular hand hygiene."

Read the NEJM article and and this report on the CDC study by Lenny Bernstein.

Posted by Brian Wolfman on Thursday, March 27, 2014 at 08:04 AM | Permalink

Wednesday, March 26, 2014

Advance medical directives and health-care savings

In LaCrosse, Wisconsin, a disproportionately large percentage of the population have advance medical directives for dealing with end-of-life care, reports NPR's Planet Money. It's a cultural thing, not a government mandate: people there are just comfortable talking about and planning for their own deaths.

LaCrosse is also notable for having the lowest health-care spending in the country.

To learn about the connection between those two data points, listen to this fascinating story.

Posted by Scott Michelman on Wednesday, March 26, 2014 at 03:55 PM | Permalink

What Should the Ninth Circuit Do About Garcia v. Google?

by Paul Alan Levy

When I first read Judge Kozinski’s decision for a majority of a panel of the Ninth Circuit, holding that Cindy Lee Garcia, who has received death threats because her role in the movie Innocence of Muslims makes her appear to have cast serious aspersions on the prophet Mohammed, could assert her copyright in her five second performance and thus demand removal of the entire film from YouTube on infringement grounds, I had very mixed feelings. 

Like the panel, I was outraged by her allegations about how she had been lied to procure her participation, and moved by the consequences she had endured; it was plainly a case in which the equities seemed to cry out for a way to do her justice.  On the other hand, I was inclined to agree with devastating arguments about the panel’s copyright rulings, put forward by bloggers whom I often find reliable in these contexts, such as Eric Goldman, Mike Masnick; Rebecca Tushnet came later. Moreover, it worried me that the majority had issued an appellate preliminary injunction (rather than just remanding to allow the trial court to enter one), without the slightest concern about the prior restraint ramifications.  On third hand, I was inclined to agree with Marc Randazza’s comment that this whole problem could have been avoided if Google, considering the great injustice wrought upon Garcia by the filmmakers, had simply exercised its discretion as a section 230 host to take down the video.

Google sought a stay pending appeal; that stay was denied by the panel; although a member of the Court called for a en banc vote on the stay issue, the stay failed to command sufficient votes and hence was denied.  But the Ninth Circuit has invited any prospective amici to file short amicus briefs (no more than 2500 words) addressing Google's petition for rehearing en banc.

Public Citizen’s Amicus Filing
Last week we filed an amicus brief addressing several issues pertaining to the viability of the preliminary injunction against the posting of the Innocence of Muslims.   Amicus briefs are not due until mid-April, after the due date for Garcia’s response, but we decided that it was only fair to allow Garcia to consider our position in crafting her response to Google’s petition.

Continue reading "What Should the Ninth Circuit Do About Garcia v. Google?" »

Posted by Paul Levy on Wednesday, March 26, 2014 at 11:30 AM | Permalink

Tuesday, March 25, 2014

CFPB "data point" on payday loans

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has released what it calls a "data point" on payday lendingAf. It's a small study based on data that the CFPB obtained from payday lenders in conjunction with the agency's supervisory authority over those lenders. The data indicate that many payday borrowers are habitual payday borrowers. After the jump are what the agency describes as the report's "key findings":

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Posted by Brian Wolfman on Tuesday, March 25, 2014 at 03:52 PM | Permalink

Public Justice on arbitration "bait and switch"

As our friends at Public Justice explain,

A lot of advocates for forced arbitration like to make a big deal out of how generally corporations pay most of the arbitration fees (that can be pretty expensive), rather than sticking those on the typical worker or consumer. . . .

But the thing is, on those rare occasions when consumers do take a case to arbitration, a LOT of corporations don’t even keep their promise . . . . The consumers are faced with the choice of themselves paying the fees that the corporation had promised to pay, or having to drop the arbitration and go back and file in court, having wasted a lot of time and some money (which is the point, of course).

A lot of advocates for forced arbitration like to make a big deal out of how generally corporations pay most of the arbitration fees (that can be pretty expensive), rather than sticking those on the typical worker or consumer.  - See more at: http://publicjustice.net/blog/bait-and-switch-many-corporations-promise-to-pay-arbitration-fees-but-don%27t#sthash.gLJx42vf.dpuf

Read more here.

 

Posted by Scott Michelman on Tuesday, March 25, 2014 at 02:28 PM | Permalink

7th circuit holds that a debt collector's offer to "settle" a time-barred debt may violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

by Brian Wolfman

A couple weeks ago, in McMahon v. LVNV Funding (and a companion case), the Seventh Circuit held that debt collectors' letters to consumers offering to "settle" time-barred debts (that is, debts that would be subject to a successful statute-of-limitations defense) could mislead consumers and, thus, could violate the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). As a result, the court of appeals reversed the dismissal of a suit alleging that plaintiffs were misled in violation of the FDCPA and affirmed (in an interlocutory appeal) a lower court's refusal to dismiss a similar suit. The court of appeals explained that

The proposition that a debt collector violates the FDCPA when it misleads an unsophisticated consumer to believe a time-barred debt is legally enforceable, regardless of whether litigation is threatened, is straightforward under the statute. Section 1692e(2)(A) specifically prohibits the false representation of the character or legal status of any debt. Whether a debt is legally enforceable is a central fact about the character and legal status of that debt. A misrepresentation about that fact thus violates the FDCPA. Matters may be even worse if the debt collector adds a threat of litigation, see 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5), but such a threat is not a necessary element of a claim. We recognize that this interpretation conflicts with that of the Eighth and Third Circuits. See Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d 28, 33 (3d Cir. 2011); Freyermuth v. Credit Bureau Servs., Inc., 248 F.3d 767, 771 (8th Cir. 2001). With respect, however, we have concluded that the statute cannot bear the reading that those courts have given it. [footnote omitted] In their view, if a dunning letter on a time‐barred debt states that the collector could sue but promised not to, that letter would not violate the FDCPA, since no litigation was actually threatened (and indeed was expressly rejected). On its face, that may seem reasonable, but closer examination reveals why it is not. The plain language of the FDCPA prohibits not only threatening to take actions that the collector cannot take, but also the use of any false, deceptive, or misleading representation, including those about the character or legal status of any debt. If a debt collector stated that it could sue on a timebarred debt but was promising to forbear, that statement would be a false representation about the legal status of that debt. * * * Our decision today does not require debt collectors to conduct additional research. If a debt collector does not know whether the debt submitted for collection is time barred, it would be easy to include general language about that possibility. That said, we find it unlikely that debt owners lack knowledge about the age of the debts they are attempting to collect. If the debt collector is the original creditor, it will know the relevant dates. If the collector is a third party collecting on behalf of the original creditor, it should easily be able to get that information at the time the file is assigned by the original creditor on whose behalf it is acting. If the collector has purchased the debt from the original creditor, we know from the [Federal Trade Commission] that such buyers pay different amounts for debts depending on the age of the debt and the number of previous attempts to collect it, in which case whether the debt is time‐barred should be known.

The Seventh Circuit noted that its ruling was consistent with positions taken by the Federal Trade Commission and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and said that it was "inclined to defer to the agencies’ empirical research and expertise" on what a consumer would think is meant by a debt collector's letter proposing "settlement" or making an “offer for settlement.”

The Seventh Circuit's 3-0 decision was written by Judge Diane Wood. Because the court's ruling created a circuit conflict, the Seventh Circuit panel circulated its decision to the full court, and no active judge voted to rehear the case en banc.

Posted by Brian Wolfman on Tuesday, March 25, 2014 at 07:51 AM | Permalink

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