Recently, we told you about Andrew Pincus's articles defending the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in AT&T v. Concepcion and extolling what he sees as the virtues of individual arbitration. (As you will recall, Concepcion upheld AT&T's class action ban, which was laundered through an arbitration clause in
the company's form contracts with its cell-phone service subscribers. The California Supreme Court had held in an earlier case (Discover Bank) that a similar class action ban was unconscionable under generally applicable state contract law, but the U.S. Supreme Court held in Concepcion that California law conflicted with the Federal Arbitration Act.)
In this response to Pincus, Duke law professor Paul Carrington (pictured to the right) explains that Concepcion undermines the policy of the federal civil rulemakers who, when they drafted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) in 1965, sought to provide plaintiffs with a practical mechanism for combatting large-scale business fraud (which is often small on an individual basis, but massive in the aggregate). Carrington goes on:
The facts of the Concepcion case provide a premier example of the reason for the [class action] rule. AT&T Mobility cheated many thousands of customers out of $30 apiece by promising to provide a new phone for free and then billing each recipient for a $30 sales tax. Of course the firm's executives who approved this scam were fully aware that it was a fraud. They also knew that very few of those who were cheated would care enough about $30 to pursue a claim.
Carrington laments that the Supreme Court's decision upheld AT&T's ban on class aribtration (as well as class litigation) on the ground that class arbitration is incompatible with the Federal Aribtration Act. As he puts it, "[a]ggregation in arbitration would perhaps have been a reasonable compromise that would have spared AT&T the cost and the disgrace of having its misdeeds the subject of public litigation, but would have made efficient enforcement of consumers' rights a possibility."
Carrington concludes that the "small-scale consumer frauds that the Court effectively deterred by its 1965 promulgation of Rule 23(b)(3) can be expected to return on a large scale."