As explained in today's New York Times, that's what law professor Eric Posner and economist E. Glen Weyl propose in this paper. Would we have averted the financial meltdown if a government regulator had pre-tested credit default swaps? Weyl seems to think so:
We tried an experiment with a very radical form of deregulation that has very little basis in sound economic science. What we’re advocating is to do the best we can to put the genie back in the bottle.
The authors say that their new pre-screening agency is at least as important as the FDA:
The potential dangers of financial instruments, they argue, “seem at least as extreme as the dangers of medicines.” They contend that new instruments should be approved by a “financial products agency” that would test them for social utility. Ideally, products deemed too costly to society over all — those that serve only to increase speculation, for example — would be rejected, the two professors say. “It is not the main purpose of our proposal to protect consumers and other unsophisticated investors from shady practices or their own ignorance,” they wrote. “Our goal is rather to deter financial speculation because it is welfare-reducing and contributes to systemic risk.”
Here's the abstract from the Posner-Weyl article:
The financial crisis of 2008 was caused in part by speculative investment in complex derivatives. In enacting the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress sought to address the problem of speculative investment, but merely transferred that authority to various agencies, which have not yet found a solution. We propose that when firms invent new financial products, they be forbidden to sell them until they receive approval from a government agency designed along the lines of the FDA, which screens pharmaceutical innovations. The agency would approve financial products if they satisfy a test for social utility that focuses on whether the product will likely be used more often for hedging than for speculation. Other factors may be addressed if the answer is ambiguous. This approach would revive and make quantitatively precise the common-law insurable interest doctrine, which helped control financial speculation before deregulation in the 1990s.

