by Deepak Gupta
From time to time on this blog, we've brought you updates on how the Supreme Court's docket is shaping up when it comes to consumers' rights. The Supreme Court isn't the most transparent of institutions and it can be hard to get information about how cases are making their way to the Court, let alone information that's focused on the public interest perspective.
Now there's a new resource for those who want to know about petitions with the potential to affect the rights of consumers, workers, and individuals: an emailed watchlist that brings you detailed information about the status of pending cert petitions before every conference. The watchlist is the product of Public Citizen's Alan Morrison Supreme Court Assistance Project, which has spent the last seventeen years tracking the thousands of cert petitions that arrive at the Supreme Court every day to find important public interest cases and offer pro bono assistance. Emma Cheuse, the current project fellow, has done a terrific job launching this listserv.
To sign up, click here.
by Jeff Sovern
A couple of weeks ago, Chris Peterson blogged about a credit union president's warning that the new statute regulating loans to service members and their dependents "might well be called the death to lending to service members act.” In other words, lenders faced with a choice between complying with the new statute or not lending to service members will simply decline to lend to soldiers. I wonder if that would qualify as discrimination against the military. Such discrimination would certainly raise public relations issues, but would it be lawful?
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) does not explicitly bar discrimination on the basis of military status, and there's even a case, Williams v. Amity Bank, 703 F. Supp. 223 (D. Conn. 1988), that seems to stand for the proposition that ECOA does not reach such discrimination. But there are some interesting wrinkles on that. First, at least one state's law bars discrimination on the basis of military status (though such state statutes would probably be preempted as to federal lenders). See N.Y. Exec. L. § 296-a. Second, courts have approved the use of the disparate effects test under ECOA. In other words, if a ban on lending to the military would have a disparate effect on a protected group under the statute, it could be found to violate ECOA (though in fact the determination would depend on much more than that--for example, lenders are allowed to defend on the ground that the challenged practice is legitimate--and proving a disparate effect might be difficult). I don't know enough about the composition of the military to know if the relevant demographics would justify a disparate impact claim, but it's an interesting thought.
I suspect that if lenders did decline to lend to soldiers because of the statute, at least some members of Congress would support a New York-like approach to banning credit discrimination against service members.
by Brian Wolfman
Yesterday, the California Supreme Court issued its decision in Grisham v. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc.,
No. S132772 (12/15/07). Answering certified questions from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the court held that the statute of limitations for tobacco physical-injury cases runs from when the plaintiff 's physical injuries were, or reasonably could have been, discovered. The decision is a very important victory for California tobacco plaintiffs, who previously were effectively barred, at least in federal court actions. That's because, in 2002, the Ninth Circuit, construing California law, had held that the statute of limitations runs from the date the plaintiff knew or should have known that she was addicted to tobacco. The San Francisco Chronicle reports on the unanimous decison here.
by Deepak Gupta
The headline of a piece in today's Washington Post reads The Banker's Candidate: Senator Dodd Amasses Huge Warchest. In the interest of balance, the story mentions Dodd's recent leadership on predatory mortgage lending and high-interest credit cards, but the overwhelming focus is on his close ties with the banking industry. The Post also includes a data-filled chart (on left; click to enlarge), showing Dodd's donations from the finance and insurance industries over time. Here's a snippet:
Connecticut Sen. Christopher J. Dodd has two big jobs. He is a candidate for the Democratic nomination for president, and he chairs the Senate Banking Committee.
They are proving to be a lucrative combination. Among Democrats, Dodd's $5 million campaign nest egg is surpassed only by that of Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton (N.Y.), who has one of the most elaborate fundraising machines ever assembled.
Dodd's electoral riches can be traced to the banking panel, whose jurisdiction includes some of the wealthiest industries in America -- banking, insurance and financial services. In addition, Dodd's home state is the hedge fund and insurance capital of the country.
But it is Dodd's philosophy, not only his geography, that has made him a cash magnet. Each of these big-money interests applauds his light-handed approach to financial regulation and considers him a reliable friend -- a fact that raises questions about Dodd's viability in a Democratic field even as it bolsters his fundraising prowess.
By Brian Wolfman
In Hodges v. Feinstein, Raiss, Kelin & Booker LLC, No. A-113 (1/31/07), the New Jersey Supreme Court held, by a vote of 4 to 2, that lawyers who regularly file summary dispossess (eviction)
proceedings are “debt collectors” subject to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The majority opinion is worth reading for a number of reasons. The key holding rejected the defendant law firm’s argument that the firm was not an FDCPA “debt collector” because “the sole remedy available in a summary dispossess proceeding is possession, not money damages.” The court agreed that possession was the sole statutory remedy, but responded by relying, of all things, on reality: “We do not question the legislative intent to provide landlords a remedy of expedited possession. However, in practice, the summary dispossess action is also a powerful debt collection mechanism.” Two justices dissented, agreeing with the law firm that because the only remedy sought was possession, the firm was not a “debt collector” under the FDCPA.
Continue reading "New Jersey Supreme Court Issues Important FDCPA Decision" »
I just ran across an important National Consumer Law Center 2006 study - - The Life and Debt Cycle - - written chiefly by NCLC's Deanne Loonin, about the rising level of debt among older Americans. The study begins with these 
basic (and to me, generally surprising) facts:
Older consumers generally hold less credit card debt than younger consumers. What is new is that elders are catching up. The average credit card debt for Americans between 65 and 69 years old rose a staggering 217% between 1992 and 2001, to $5,844. Not surprisingly, given these and other trends, elders are filing bankruptcy in record numbers.
Part one of the report describes the issue in detail; part two of the report offers potential solutions. Check it out.