Consumer Law & Policy Blog

Gilles & Friedman paper on Qui Tam as a model for enforcement of group rights

Myriam E. Gilles of Cardozo and Gary B. Friedman of the Friedman Law Group have written The New Qui Tam: A Model for the Enforcement of Group Rights in a Hostile Era. Here is the abstract:

The present Administration has made clear it has no interest in enforcing statutes designed to protect workers, consumers, voters and others. And, as we have chronicled in prior work, the ability of private litigants to enforce these laws has been undercut by developments in the case law concerning class actions – particularly class-banning arbitration clauses. As these critical enforcement methods recede, will alternative methods of prosecuting claims arise? How might they work? Are they politically and fiscally sustainable? We focus here on a promising approach just now coming into view: qui tam legislation authorizing private citizens to bring representative claims on behalf of consumers, workers, and others. Progressive advocates have recently begun working with legislators in a handful of states to provide a qui tam mechanism for enforcing state statutory rights. The form these new laws might take remains uncertain and their enforceability is sure to be hotly contested by corporate interests and others. This article examines the legal and policy challenges that will face “new qui tam” legislation, and considers arguments for and against enlarging the role of citizens in prosecuting claims – an inquiry that requires us to determine the legitimacy and limits of the private attorney general model in its starkest form.

Bradley Paper: The Consumer Protection Ecosystem

Christopher G. Bradley of Kentucky has written The Consumer Protection Ecosystem: Law, Norms, and Technology. Here is the abstract:

Consumer law provokes fierce policy debate on issues from identity theft to online privacy, from arbitration clauses and class action lawsuits to Americans’ accumulation of debt and the unsavory practices sometimes used to collect. Pervasive technology in every aspect of consumer transacting has opened up many new fronts in these battles. Scholars, policymakers, and advocates have responded in kind, devoting increased energy to this area of law, which affects every single one of us, every single day. Despite its prominence, however, confusion persists regarding what consumer protection really is or does. The realities of social and technological change have not been integrated into legal analyses of consumer transactions. 

This Article constructs a novel and comprehensive model of the consumer protection ecosystem by contextualizing purely legal constraints amid the other realities of commercial relationships. Drawing on scholarship in the areas of technology, social change, and the law, the model lays out three basic types of constraints on the activities of participants in consumer commercial transactions: legal, technical, and social constraints. This model provides a basis for exploring how those constraints interact and shape behavior.

The model has significant ramifications for scholars, policymakers, and advocates. The model underscores why the area of consumer-facing commerce defies one-size-fits-all solutions; instead, it demands refined and layered consideration of consumers, merchants, and the commercial relationships they pursue, as well as the changes in the social and technological contexts of those relationships. This Article’s model provides a framework for that future research and debate.

 

Hayashi Paper: Consumer Law Myopia

Andrew T. Hayashi of Virginia has written Consumer Law Myopia. Here is the abstract:

People make mistakes with debt, partly because the chance to buy now and pay later tempts them to do things that are not in their long-term interest. Lenders sell credit products that exploit this vulnerability. In this Article, I argue that critiques of these products, particularly those that draw insights from behavioral law and economics, have a blind spot: they ignore what the borrowed funds are used for. By evaluating financing transactions in isolation from the underlying purchase, the cost-benefit analysis of consumer financial regulation is truncated and misleading. I show that the same bias that causes someone to take an exploitative loan may also imply that the loan benefits them by causing them to purchase a product or service that they should, but wouldn’t otherwise, buy. I demonstrate the importance of this effect in a study of tax refund anticipation loans. I find that regulation curtailing these loans reduced the use of paid tax preparers and the takeup of the earned income tax credit, which is the second largest federal transfer to low-income households.

A Way for Consumer Agencies to Generate Thought on Issues of Interest

by Jeff Sovern

A post inspired by a question I heard Kathleen Engel ask: every year second-year students ask professors for suggestions for topics to write about for law reviews. Law professors and other lawyers also cast about for article topics.  Meanwhile, administrative agencies often confront questions about what the law is or how it should develop, questions that might benefit from some thought from outsiders. It might serve all these groups--as well as the public and the development of the law--if the CFPB, FTC, and other agencies posted on their web sites a list of possible topics about which law students, law professors, and other lawyers could fruitfully write about. The ANPR process already entails something similar, but this is somewhat different in that it isn't limited to rule-making and could simply be a list which is revised from time to time.

Berkeley Consumer Law Scholars Conference 2019 Opens This Thursday

The Berkeley Center for Consumer Law & Economic Justice is holding its Consumer Law Scholars Conference on Thursday and Friday. More information, including the papers to be discussed, here.  The Conference has an impressive list of participants and it promises to be a terrific event.

Sarin study finds interventions in credit and overdraft markets increased consumer welfare but interventions in debit market decreased it

Natasha Sarin of Penn has written Making Consumer Finance Work. Here's the abstract:

The financial crisis exposed major faultlines in banking and financial markets more broadly. Policymakers responded with far-reaching regulation that created a new agency—the CFPB—and changed the structure and function of these markets. 

Consumer advocates cheered reforms as welfare-enhancing, while the financial sector declared that consumers would be harmed by interventions. With a decade of data now available, this Article presents the first empirical examination of the successes and failures of the consumer finance reform agenda. Specifically, I marshal data from every zip code and bank in the United States to test the efficacy of three of the most significant post-crisis reforms: in the debit, credit, and overdraft markets. 

The results of my analysis are surprising. Despite cosmetic similarities, these reforms had very different outcomes. Two (changes in the credit and overdraft markets) increase consumer welfare, while the other (in the debit market) decreases it. These findings run counter to prior work by prominent legal scholars and push us to reevaluate our (mis)conceptions about the efficacy of regulation. 

The empirical evidence leads me to novel insights for regulatory design. First, banks regularly levy hidden fees on consumers, obscuring the true cost of financial products. Regulators should restrict such practices. Second, consumer finance markets are regressive: low-income customers pay higher prices than their higher-income counterparts. Regulators should address this inequity. Finally, profit-maximizing banks will always discourage regulation by promising its costs will be passed through to consumers. Regulators should not be overly swayed by their dire warnings.

Benoliel & Becher Paper on the Unreadability of Web Site Sign-In Wrap Contracts

Uri Benoliel of the College of Law and Business - Ramat Gan Law School and Shmuel I. Becher of the Victoria University of Wellington have written The Duty to Read the Unreadable. Here's the abstract:

The duty to read doctrine is a well-recognized building block of U.S. contract law. Under this doctrine, contracting parties are held responsible for the written terms of their contract, whether or not they actually read them. The application of duty to read is especially interesting in the context of consumer contracts, which consumers generally do not read. 

Under U.S. law, courts routinely impose this doctrine on consumers. However, the application of this doctrine to consumer contracts is one-sided. While consumers are excepted to read their contracts, suppliers are generally not required to offer readable contracts. This asymmetry creates a serious public policy challenge. Put simply, consumers might be expected to read contracts that are, in fact, rather unreadable. This, in turn, undermines market efficiency and raises fairness concerns. 

Numerous scholars have suggested that consumer contracts are indeed written in a way that dissuades consumers from reading them. This Article aims to empirically test whether this concern is justified. The Article focuses on the readability of an important and prevalent type of consumer agreements: the sign-in-wrap contract. Such contracts, which have already been the focal point of many legal battles, are routinely accepted by consumers when signing up for popular websites such as Facebook, Amazon, Uber, and Airbnb. 

The Article applies well-established linguistic readability tests to the 500 most popular websites in the U.S. that use sign-in-wrap agreements. We find, among other things, that effectively reading these agreements requires, on average, more than 14.5 years of education. This result is troubling, given that the majority of U.S. adults read at an 8th-grade level. These empirical findings hence have significant implications for the design of consumer contract law.

Jacob Hale Russell Paper Shows Death of Unconscionablity Doctrine is Greatly Exaggerated

Jacob Hale Russell of Rutgers and Stanford's Arthur & Toni Rembe Rock Center for Corporate Governance has written Unconscionability's Greatly Exaggerated Death. Here is the abstract:

Reports of unconscionability’s demise are greatly exaggerated. According to conventional wisdom, the common-law contracts doctrine is rarely used, except in limiting clauses that purport to waive consumers’ remedial rights. In fact, as this Article documents, the doctrine is quietly flourishing: courts are using it to strike down substantive terms, including interest rates, in consumer finance contracts. In recent years judges across the country have rewritten or voided payday loans, signature loans, overdraft fees, and mortgage contracts on the grounds that their interest rates or other core terms were unconscionably unfair. 

Since unconscionability is alive and well, the time is ripe to answer an unexplored question in the doctrine’s contours. How tailored should the unconscionability analysis be to the characteristics of a particular consumer entering into a contract, versus untailored to the typical, median, or “reasonable” consumer? This Article advances an argument in favor of tailoring unconscionability. In addition to consistency with unconscionability’s theoretical underpinnings, tailoring brings the doctrine in line with modern contracting practices. Today’s consumer contracts involve increasing market segmentation, individualized pricing, and customization of terms, in stark contrast to the stylized view of boilerplate that most scholars take for granted. Unconscionability can thus play an important role in consumer protection policy, which faces the challenge that consumers are highly heterogeneous and need different protections. Courts have a particular edge here: they specialize in individualized fact-finding, in contrast to regulations, which are generally one-size-fits-all.

Tsesis Article: Marketplace of Ideas, Privacy, and Digital Audiences

Alexander Tsesis of Loyola of Chicago has written Marketplace of Ideas, Privacy, and Digital Audiences, forthcoming in the Notre Dame Law Review.  Here's the abstract:

The availability of almost limitless sets of digital information has opened a vast marketplace of ideas. Information service providers like Facebook and Twitter provide users with an array of personal information about products, friends, acquaintances, and strangers. While this data enriches the lives of those who share content on the internet, it comes at the expense of privacy.

Social media companies disseminate news, advertisements, political messages, while also capitalizing on consumers’ private shopping, surfing, and travel habits. Companies like Cambridge Analytica, Amazon, and Apple rely on algorithmic programs to mash-up and scrape enormous amounts of online and otherwise available personal data to micro-target audiences. By collecting and then processing psychometric data sets, commercial and political advertisers rely on emotive advertisements to manipulate biases and vulnerabilities that impact audiences’ shopping and voting habits.

The Free Speech Clause is not an absolute bar to the regulation of commercial intermediaries who exploit private information obtained on the digital marketplace of ideas. The Commerce Clause authorizes passage of law to regulate internet companies that monetize intimate data and resell it to third parties. Rather than applying strict scrutiny to such proposed regulations as one would to pure speech, judges should rely on intermediate scrutiny to test statutes limiting the commercial marketing of data.

Legislative reforms are needed to address the substantial economic effects of massive, commercial agglomeration of data files containing histories, daily routines, medical conditions, personal habits, and the like. To address this logarithmically expanding cyber phenomenon, Congress should temporally restrict the retention and trade in private data. Internet intermediaries should not be immune from such a restriction on private data storage. For such a policy to be effective, safe harbor provisions shielding internet intermediaries should be modified to allow for civil litigation against internet companies that refuse a data subject’s request to remove personal information no longer needed to accomplish the transaction for which it was originally processed.

Paper: Geography of Credit Invisibility

Kenneth P. Brevoort, Jasper Clarkberg, Michelle Kambara, and Benjamin Litwin, all currently or formerly at the CFPB, have written The Geography of Credit Invisibility. Here's the abstract:

This study builds on the Bureau’s earlier work and examines the relationship between geography and credit invisibility. The importance of geography in accessing credit has been long-standing concern for policymakers, going at least as far back as early efforts to combat redlining. In recent years, additional interest has been paid to the problems faced by people in “credit deserts,” which generally are defined as areas with little access to traditional sources of credit. Because credit deserts have limited options for accessing credit, residing in those areas may inhibit the ability of consumers to establish an NCRA credit record. If so, the incidence of credit invisibility should be higher in credit deserts than in areas with better access to traditional credit.

This study examines geographic patterns in the incidence of credit invisibility to assess the extent to which where one resides is correlated with one’s likelihood of remaining credit invisible. While determining the underlying factors that cause sustained credit invisibility is difficult and beyond the scope of this study, highlighting geographic variation in credit invisibility can aid policymakers and advance the conversation around potential causes and solutions.